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Reading the EU’s migration 







This article addresses contemporary thinking about EU crises from the locations of South-East 
and Eastern Europe. It asks how the European migration and security ‘crises’ have unfolded 
in institutional structures, political and public discourses, and people’s everyday experiences in 
South-Eastern and Eastern Europe. The analysis challenges the treatment of European crises as 
ontologically given, and calls for the adoption of critical conceptual and analytical approaches that 
study these crises outside European dis/order binarism. It exposes European crises as a privileged 
and conservative designation that normalizes European multiplicity within the teleology of a linear 
and spatially bound EU institutional order.
Keywords
critical European Studies, Eastern Europe, EU crisis, EU neighbourhood, European dis/order, 
European migration crisis, European security crisis, South-East Europe
The aim of this article is to bring the conversation about European crises to the context 
of the European Union’s (EU’s) enlargement and neighbourhood governance. More spe-
cifically, it makes use of empirical insights into the EU’s crisis governance in enlarge-
ment and neighbourhood countries to critically address conceptual discussions within 
European studies on the meaning of European crises and the construction of Europe 
Corresponding author:
Senka Neuman Stanivuković, University of Groningen, Oude Kijk in ’t Jatstraat 26, 9712EK Groningen,  
The Netherlands. 
Email: s.neuman-stanivukovic@rug.nl
859176 JES0010.1177/0047244119859176Neuman Stanivuković and Neuman
research-article2019
Neuman Stanivuković and Neuman 375
through these crises. We start from the premise that the EU’s immediate ‘outside’ com-
plicates the binary distinction between ‘crisis’ and ‘normality’. Thinking about European 
integration through the stories and practices of what is constructed as the EU’s immedi-
ate outside makes visible the porousness of the EU’s institutions and borders. The loca-
tion of the EU’s outside allows us to see and critique how the EU’s crisis discourses 
prioritize and acknowledge events and vulnerabilities closer to the EU’s institutional 
core, while side-lining others further afield.
In this article, we see events grouped together under the common denominator of 
‘European crisis’ as multifaceted. This is why the teleological reading of the European 
project, which uses the EU’s institutional order as a normative structure for codifying 
certain events as European crises while side-lining others, is not exhaustive. Because 
crises are evaluated against stability or disruptions in the EU’s institutional order, some 
crises are seen as more European, or more of a crisis, than others; the mutual constitution 
of events classified as crises remains overlooked; and the articulation of some events and 
experiences as a particular form of European crisis normalizes and silences others.
The need to examine the European crisis beyond the conceptual confines of the 
European institutional order becomes particularly evident in the case of enlargement of 
the EU and its relations with neighbouring countries. The EU’s enlargement and neigh-
bourhood governance speak to the ambiguity of the institutional, temporal and spatial 
boundaries of the EU, which becomes even more evident in the context of the EU’s 
crisis management. This relies substantially on the concurrent extension of EU rules 
and norms beyond EU borders on the one hand, and differentiation of the level and 
scope of the respective states’ integration with the EU on the other hand (Lavanex, 
2016). The observed shifts in governance practices correspond with the reconceptual-
ization of the EU’s constitutive outside – the countries subject to its enlargement and 
neighbourhood governance – as unstable liminal spaces where the European order is to 
be installed and defended (Johansson-Nogués, 2018).
The extension of the EU’s institutional and policy architecture beyond the EU proper 
through the neighbourhood and enlargement governance obscures the understanding of 
the EU as institutionally consolidated and spatially bounded. The territories, governing 
apparatuses and populations of countries subject to enlargement and neighbourhood gov-
ernance become articulated in the EU, thereby redefining the EU/non-EU dichotomy 
(Casas-Cortes et al., 2012). As post-socialist but not yet or not fully EU-ropean, South-
East and Eastern Europe, in particular, take an institutionally, spatially and temporally 
provisional and therefore indeterminable position vis-à-vis the EU. This position compli-
cates a distinction between what is orderly and what is disorderly and obscures the pos-
sibility of naming a crisis in opposition to normality and renewal. More explicitly, the 
indeterminacy of South-East and Eastern Europe makes crisis judgement, and the ques-
tion of what went wrong, illegible. This is why the perspectives of South-East and Eastern 
Europe bring questions of erasure, invisibility and idleness into the core of the discussion 
on the European crisis and as such offer a critical intervention into the conceptual discus-
sions of the crisis as a rupture and a turning point in EU integration.
Accordingly, this article proposes a more nuanced reading of crises – one that accounts 
for the multiplicities and contradictions inherent in the European integration project. The 
argument is organized as follows. Conceptually, the article first maps the teleological 
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assumptions about the European project within European studies and, in particular, 
European crisis literature, examining the implications of these assumptions when clas-
sifying certain events as normal and others as a failure and a deviation from the normal. 
We explain how through the analytical prism of European integration as a linear progres-
sion towards the EU’s institutional order, multiple contingencies are construed as either 
disruptions or renewals of that order. In response, this article reconceptualizes European 
integration as a continuous spatial and institutional re(b)ordering through multiple socio-
technological assemblages (Bialasiewicz et al., 2009; Moisio, 2016; Richardson and 
Jensen, 2003). Applying this insight to the discussion of the European crisis allows for 
the analysis of events and experiences that occur outside politicized and mediatized EU 
crisis discourses.
Methodologically, with a particular focus on EU governance in South-East and 
Eastern Europe, we aim to deconstruct claims about the essence of the European project 
which render possible differentiations between order (normality) and disorder (crisis). 
The indeterminacy of South-East and Eastern Europe vis-à-vis the EU helps us prob-
lematize how crisis is defined by the order/disorder binary. Rather than discussing the 
truthfulness of some crisis narratives over others, and evaluating the corresponding 
capacity of existing conceptual accounts of the European crisis to encompass the multi-
plicity of stories and experiences, we are interested in cases where these accounts col-
lapse. By grounding the analysis in small-scale exploratory studies of, firstly, the 
so-called ‘European migration crisis’ in South-East Europe, and, second, the security 
crisis in the Eastern EU neighbourhood countries (particularly Ukraine), we question the 
analytical usefulness of asking what a European crisis means and shift the analysis to 
asking how the crisis operates. We show how the production of South-East Europe and 
the Eastern neighbourhood as resilient subjects by the EU’s security and border assem-
blages intersects with the experience on the ground of incoherence and discontinuity. 
The European crisis is concurrently confirmed in the articulated necessity of protecting 
the European order in the resilient neighbourhood, and simultaneously made banal, illeg-
ible and idle in its instability.
European crises and the EU’s institutional dis/order
Challenges to the EU’s institutional order by the manifold events codified as European 
crises have mobilized a discussion on the ability of existing theoretical lenses to make 
sense of the now visible complexities of the political, societal and cultural encounters 
linked to European integration. These events have exposed the pro-integration bias 
inherent to EU integration theorizing, with the available analytical tools proving ill-
equipped to predict and respond to those events that vividly challenge the narrative of 
EU integration as a linear progression towards ‘an ever closer union’ (Börzel, 2018). In 
the context of the EU’s crisis management, strengthening the institutions has, at times, 
resulted in more societal uncertainty and instability, whereas the institutions’ flexibility 
and differentiation has become the new norm characterizing the EU’s renewal process 
(Schimmelfennig et al., 2015). Scholarship responded by developing novel vocabulary 
such as ‘failing forward’, ‘differentiated integration’ and ‘constraining politicization’ to 
reorient analysis back to the EU’s institutional order (Börzel and Risse, 2018; Holzinger 
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and Schimmelfennig, 2012; Jones et al., 2016). These analytical tools are valuable for a 
more nuanced insight of the crises, but they are not exhaustive.
Crises are overwhelmingly conceptualized as the euro or the Schengen crises and 
analysed as, first, a systemic rupture due to the failure of institutions to respond to exter-
nal shocks and, second, institutional stagnation or renewal through political and policy 
processes including supra-nationalization, intergovernmental conflict and/or politiciza-
tion (Börzel and Risse, 2018; Falkner, 2018). As such, the literature is teleological 
because it concentrates multiple processes and events around the EU’s institutional order. 
The teleological conflation of the European political project with the EU’s institutional 
order and the consequent insistence on measuring and evaluating manifold crises in 
regard to this order makes it difficult for the literature to pose questions about the con-
nections between the many crises and their multiple geographical and temporal manifes-
tations (Kjaer and Olsen, 2016). Critical interventions in the discussion show a need to 
complement the nominal arguments (i.e. the European crisis is this/that; it has func-
tioned/functions as this/that) with inquiries into the practices and performances of mak-
ing and governing Europe in crisis (Cordero et al., 2017). These inquiries include closer 
scrutiny of what kind of conceptual work a crisis does in relation to the temporal and 
spatial structures that define European political order. Of particular relevance becomes 
the question of how the crisis/normality binarism reproduces and contests the temporali-
ties and spatialities of the EU, consequently making certain events visible and subjects 
vulnerable and reparable, and others not.
We enter the discussion through the alleged absence of South-East and Eastern Europe 
in the European crises. Rendering crises legible as crises of the European institutional 
order construes the political processes, practices and everyday experiences in the 
European neighbourhood and enlargement countries as ordinary and/or as an external 
threat to the EU. European crises are normalized in the EU’s neighbouring countries in 
the way that events that are signified as meaningful and disruptive for the EU proper are 
deemed normal, regular, ordinary and therefore unintelligible in the non-EU proper. To 
illustrate, economic stagnation, social unrest, contested territorialities, illiberalism or 
failing (trust in) institutions are signified as crises for the European Union and endemic 
for the non-EU (Jones and Clark, 2008). It is not that the neighbourhood is seen as stable, 
but rather that the order/disorder and normality/crisis distinction is suspended because 
uncertainty and instability are seen as chronic and therefore a rule.
At the same time, various escalations of violence or wholesale destabilization in the non-
EU proper are only signified as European crises when visualized and intensified as a threat 
to the EU proper. EU/non-EU and order/disorder binaries are transgressed in the construc-
tion of the EU/enlargement policy nexus and the EU/European neighbourhood policy nexus, 
as resilient enlargement and neighbourhood countries become integral to EU crisis manage-
ment and to restoring European certainty and secure sense of self. The immediate neigh-
bourhood thus becomes the EU’s showcase arena to prove its ability to inject order into 
the unstable other, not solely and primarily for the sake of the neighbourhood, but also for 
the sake of a more secure EU in the eyes of EU citizens (Johansson-Nogués, 2018).
As a result, the discourse and practice of European crises construct the enlargement 
and neighbourhood countries concurrently as silent – chronically disorderly and 
lethargic – and explosive – rampant, chaotic and threatening. The crisis is both 
378 Journal of European Studies 49(3–4)
normalized as chronic, endemic and interior to the enlargement/neighbourhood other, 
and spectacularized through representations of the potential crisis and conflict spill-
over to the EU.
As such, the nature of the enlargement/neighbourhood as always ‘becoming 
Europe’ locates the crisis somewhere in the drift between the insignificant and the 
spectacularized that we can never fully know. This crisis that is always in the potential 
unsettles the common-sense distinction between crisis and normality, and order and 
disorder. Reading the European crisis through the enlargement and neighbourhood 
implodes the boundaries between an orderly Europe and the disorderly other, showing 
limitations in the understanding of a crisis as a value judgement about the displaced 
order. The crisis is defined by a degree of indeterminacy that escapes our conceptual 
grasp and evaluative tools located in the binarisms of crisis/normality, order/disorder 
and self/other.
Unsettling European crises from the East – methodological 
considerations
Within this article, we take, as our point of departure, this indeterminacy of the European 
crises in South-East and Eastern Europe to explain the alleged absence of these regions 
from the European crises and to think outside the established institutional readings of the 
European crises. We argue from the geographic and temporal location of South-East and 
Eastern Europe as a becoming-Europe that cannot be settled within the EU/non-EU 
binary or along the linear post-socialist/European continuum. South-East and Eastern 
Europe unsettle the existing readings of the European crisis not because of their position 
in between the post-socialist and European, but due to the indeterminacy of their respec-
tive futures, which are illegible by the post-socialist/European continuum. This refers in 
particular to the condition of the post-socialist transition, where transition is never fully 
completed, while being European is desired but not fully achievable. In South-East and 
Eastern Europe, the European institutional order is detached from its original meaning 
and purpose to become a synonym for becoming European, and the enlargement and 
neighbourhood governance are also defined and legitimized through this never com-
pletely fulfillable desire for Europe.
While cautiously drawing from a difficult conversation between postcolonial, post-
socialist and decolonial scholarship, authors such as Baker (2018), Bjelić (2018), and 
Chari and Verdery (2009) have been calling for a better understanding of how the 
European political project is negotiated in and through Europe’s multiple peripheries. 
This scholarship has argued that the post-Cold War disappearance of East/West binarism 
has displaced and disoriented the South-East and Eastern European subject through the 
loss of the East, which was never fully substituted by the West in the context of European 
integration (Iveković, 2004). Kovačević (2008a; 2008b) suggests that the legacy of post-
colonial work is key in examining the EU’s proto-colonial relationship with its Eastern 
periphery. This includes the exploitation of labour and extraction of resources and the 
colonial-type mechanisms of controlled transformation, as well as Eastern Europe’s own 
self-orientalization, which is engraved in the EU accession/neighbourhood framework. 
Tlostanova (2012) sees the post-socialist subject as defined by a futureless ontology that 
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emerges from the realization that the desired transition from the East and the socialist to 
‘Europe’, cultivated by the ‘catch-up’ and ‘return-to-Europe’ Europeanization projects, 
is unattainable. The double fallout of modernity in its socialist and Western European 
vernaculars dispossesses the post-socialist subject of any teleology. Tlostanova’s posi-
tion can be associated with the established critique of transitology, and Europeanization 
as its spin-off, for reducing the post-socialist subject to the embodiment of nothingness 
that is then reproduced and reformed in accordance with the West. Gržinić and Tatlić 
(2014) suggest that the aftermath of the Cold War has enabled an erasure of the (former) 
Eastern Europe through its exclusion from history, knowledge and memory and its repro-
duction as a copy and a frontier of (as/in/at) the new Europe. (Former) Eastern Europe is 
thus excluded from the possible and becomes a plastic and fluid terrain in which the 
(former) West reproduces and establishes itself as Europe. Buden (2010) examines how 
the transition has normalized the contradictions of domination and resistance inherent in 
the eruption of freedom in a society. The (former) East was reduced to the landscape of 
nothingness and infantilized, to be trained, developed and adjusted to (now externally 
provided) democracy.
The indeterminacy of South-East and Eastern Europe that exists outside the teleolo-
gies of socialism, on the one hand, and European integration, on the other, helps us locate 
crises beyond the binarism of the European institutional order and disorder. Consequently, 
we think about crisis through the indeterminacy of South-East and Eastern Europe, as 
these regions become unbound from the teleologies of the socialist past and European 
future. Rather than adopting a teleological judgement of a European crisis as an order 
that was disrupted and/or renewed, the adopted perspective helps us define Europe 
through multiplicity, relationality, fluidity and therefore also indeterminacy, which are 
rendered abnormal and disorderly through the notion of a crisis.
Hence, we analyse discourses and practices that define the eventfulness and appre-
hensibility of European crises to see what cannot be determined by these crisis designa-
tions. Reading European crises through the indeterminacy of South-East and Eastern 
Europe exposes the crisis as a privileged designation that seeks to stabilize contradic-
tions and contingencies that are inherent to social and political spheres (Masco, 2017; 
Roitman, 2013). Roitman (2013) writes about crisis as a conservative value judgement 
about what went wrong that conditions political potentiality between collapse, on the one 
hand, and continuous improvement, on the other, and which legitimizes political action 
through a sense of urgency to restore order. With this in mind, the invisibility and une-
ventfulness of processes in South-East and Eastern Europe in the European crisis opens 
up the question of whether it is possible to judge something as a crisis outside the dis/
order binary. As judgements about the presence or absence of a European crisis are 
tainted by the teleology of the European institutional order, our analysis takes recourse 
to the indeterminate crises which are hard to represent, notice and apprehend – hence, to 
crisis potentiality.
We ask how illegible events become legible as European crises and, subsequently, 
how they become governed, contested and sustained in view of the fluid and contradic-
tory dynamics of European governance. Additionally, we analyse how the temporal and 
spatial structures established by the European crisis/renewal narratives are constituted, 
moulded and unsettled in South-East and Eastern Europe when combined with other 
380 Journal of European Studies 49(3–4)
practices and knowledge. To this end, the analysis is situated in two small-scale explora-
tory studies: first, the so-called European migration crisis from the perspective of South-
East Europe; and, second, the security crisis in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood, 
particularly Ukraine. These two small-scale exploratory studies are not comparative in 
nature, but are meant to shed light on what perspectives from the EU’s immediate outside 
might tell us about European crises.
In the first case, we analyse how the crisis became legible as a European migration 
crisis but was also unsettled in the location of South-East Europe. We read the EU’s crisis-
governance discourses and practices, particularly around the formalization and de- 
formalization of the so-called Western Balkan Route, against the experiences on the 
ground, the mobility practices and strategies of migrants, and the emergent migrant appa-
ratuses. To untangle the EU’s migration/enlargement governance assemblage in the 
region, the analysis draws on multilateral agreements, European Council and European 
Commission communications, and Frontex analysis reports related to the EU’s migration 
governance along the Western Balkan and Eastern Mediterranean migration routes. 
Furthermore, it relies on European Commission and national documentation and com-
munication concerning enlargement progress, and documents related to the migration and 
asylum policies of South-East European countries. This is then juxtaposed with reports, 
mapping archives and migrant testimonies published by non-governmental organizations 
and grassroots activist networks, supported by the authors’ close ties to grassroots com-
munities in the region. In the second case, we analyse the emergence of – and the EU’s 
responses to – the security crisis in the Eastern neighbourhood post-Euromaidan. We dis-
cuss new governance approaches, mostly grounded in the logic of strengthening resil-
ience, that the EU developed in order to normalize the crisis potentiality of the region. To 
this end, we draw on primary documents issued by the European Commission, the 
European Council and the European External Action Service, bearing witness to the EU’s 
gradual bringing of the East into the EU proper and subsequent policy adaptations.
Each case is organized in two steps. In the first step, we analyse how the optic of the 
European crisis makes indeterminacy legible, manageable and quantifiable through the 
technologies of European governance, including mechanisms, procedures, instru-
ments, vocabularies and micro-practices, such as timetables and statistical databases of 
crisis management and resilience-building. We take note of the emergence of novel 
assemblages that reassemble the existing boundaries of the European order in the con-
text of European crisis management. We argue that these assemblages incorporate the 
crisis potentiality into the fabric of the European political project through the construc-
tion of a subject that is inherently precarious or vulnerable but also resilient. In the 
second step, we explore crisis potentiality further by asking if and how one can concur-
rently be in and overcome the crisis. We are interested in the creative practices and 
strategies through which subjects that are ‘caught in crisis’ use time and space to make 
sense of the European crisis and to make it comprehensible on their own terms. This 
two-step analytical design methodologically connects the identified exploratory stud-
ies. These studies, however, differ in the level of analysis in that the first deconstructs 
the European crisis from the grounded position of migratory assemblages, whereas the 
second adopts a more institutional reading of how the European crisis was articulated 
and governed.
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‘European crisis’ and the European border regime in 
South-East Europe
The following section outlines how the European institutional order was unsettled by the 
2015–18 migratory movement into Western Europe through landlines from Turkey to 
Greece and Bulgaria; through North Macedonia, Serbia and Bosnia; through Hungary 
and Croatia; and through Austria, Slovenia and Italy. This movement was termed the 
‘European migration crisis’ and consequently governed through the formalization and 
de-formalization of the so-called ‘Western Balkan Route’. This case is significant to our 
discussion of the indeterminacy of South-East Europe in relation to the EU as follows: it 
speaks to South-East Europe’s concurrent absence from the European crisis in terms of 
recognition, on the one hand, and its visibilization in the mediatized border/rescue spec-
tacle1 in the context of the migration crisis, on the other hand. We point out that the fluid 
nature of the EU’s border regime in South-East Europe, which is always reacting to 
migratory movements, produces multiple ‘timespace’ structures2 that stand outside the 
European institutional order. The crisis then operates as a conservative judgement that 
seeks to restore and stabilize the appearance of the European institutional order while 
restricting other narratives and courses of actions through the construction of an unsta-
ble, vulnerable, yet resilient South-East Europe. South-East European institutions and 
societies are sustained as precarious through the lens of a continuous post-socialist tran-
sition and are therefore particularly vulnerable to pressures of human mobility, while at 
the same time they are expected to adapt to these pressures and bear an active role in the 
protection of the EU’s external border. The position of the EU as an active force in the 
transformation of the region is substituted for a more restrained one, where the EU valor-
izes South-East Europe’s capacity to endure and adapt through building resilience.
The analysis focuses on how the Western Balkan Route was constructed and governed 
through an interplay between established migration control apparatuses, on the one hand, 
and grounded practices and experiences of migrants and migrant solidarity networks, on 
the other. This approach, following the established critique of the ‘Fortress Europe’ met-
aphor within critical migration and border scholarship, helps us reimagine how migrants 
become political and social subjects not only within the state, as risky or humanitarian 
subjects, or against the state as resisting subjects, but also outside the existing structures 
of statehood and citizenship (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013; Parker and Vaughan-
Williams, 2012). This perspective has two particular implications for our efforts to cri-
tique and deconstruct an understanding of the European migration crisis as a rupture in 
the EU’s institutional order. First, rather than essentializing migrants as passive objects 
of a given order that establish their subjectivity solely through practices of resistance, it 
studies how migration assemblages actively participate in the continuous remodelling of 
the EU by re-appropriating mechanisms of control, and by producing uncontrollable 
structures that then need to be tamed through the reordering of the border regime. Second, 
rather than treating border management at the external frontier of Schengen as static and 
consolidated, the European border regime is understood as a fragmented apparatus of 
capture that recuperates (manages) the knowledge and creativity of migrants’ practices 
of appropriation (Shell, 2018: 275). Variegated EU borders, including the Schengen area, 
the temporal within-Schengen border-checks, and forms of externalized border-zones/
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border-management or the so-called ‘hot-spots’ are de/re-territorialized through overlap-
ping exercises of sovereignty by multiple and heterogeneous actors including member 
states’ customs and border police, Frontex, Eurojust, Europol etc. (Council of the 
European Union, 2018; Johnson, 2017).
Migratory movements were rendered legible as the European migration crisis and, 
inter alia, the crisis of the European institutional order upon the collapse of the political, 
legal and administrative structures and materialities of the European border regime in the 
face of ‘Europe’s long summer of migration’ in 2015 and the ‘March for Hope’ of 4–6 
September, in particular (Kasparek and Speer, 2015). The March for Hope, in which over 
4000 migrants and local groups that were mobilized to act in solidarity with migrants 
collectively enacted the right to move and the right to stay by means of a 170-kilometre 
march from Budapest to the Austrian border, came in response to the decision of the 
Hungarian government to close the border and stop all trains to Austria. This was fol-
lowed by a wholesale suspension of the Dublin regulation by Germany and Austria, and 
the consequent temporary formalization of the Western Balkan Route through disruptive 
patterns of ‘opening’ the passage to migrants until November, when the passage was 
officially closed.
The formalization and de-formalization of the route can be seen as a continuation of 
the incorporation of the non-EU members of South-East Europe into the EU’s migration 
and border management regime initiated by accession-driven Europeanization. The par-
ticipation of Albania, North Macedonia and Serbia in the formalization of the route was 
triggered by the ad hoc border openings by Western European countries as well as 
migrant protests and migrant solidarity actions by grassroots structures, activists, the 
media and political opposition. Importantly, the management of migratory movements 
through partial formalizations of transit had already been practised by countries such as 
Serbia and North Macedonia throughout 2015. These passages were informal but 
acknowledged; the economy around the (in)visibility and informality of migrant transit 
was mixed, with criminalization and migrant detention but also the issuing of temporary 
documents (72-hour transit papers), the establishment of stop-centres and transit zones, 
and offers of humanitarian assistance to migrants.
In late October 2015, under Austrian leadership, three non-EU countries (Albania, 
North Macedonia and Serbia) and eight EU member states (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Romania and Slovenia) developed a coordinated approach 
to border and migration control along the West Balkan Route, which culminated in 
March 2016 with North Macedonia closing its border with Greece by building a fence, 
deploying police controls and increasing pushbacks with full political and operational 
support from the Visegrad block, Austria, Croatia and Brussels. When the route was 
formally closed, informal journeys and networks reopened with people crossing North 
Macedonia on foot, making the journey more dangerous and costly, and then waiting in 
Belgrade and Subotica to attempt to cross the border to Hungary either at legalized tran-
sit zones or at spots with less police control. The strengthening of border controls and 
increased pushbacks by Hungarian authorities throughout 2016 further strained the 
already limited humanitarian and asylum infrastructures in Serbia. What is more, the 
increased coordination of Serbian and North Macedonian migration policies with the 
EU, in conjunction with Serbia’s opening of acquis Chapter 24 on Freedom and Security, 
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resulted in a tightening of migration laws and policies, the taking down of informal 
camps and their grassroots support structures and the potential militarization of border 
controls. While many remained ‘stuck’ in Serbia, the migratory movement was also 
rerouted to Albania, Montenegro and then via Bosnia and Herzegovina to Croatia, 
Slovenia, Italy and Austria. In view of the complex governance structures that mark 
Bosnian statehood and the more opaque EU accession prospects for Bosnia, migrants 
became mostly concentrated in informal camps in Bihać and Velika Kladuša, where they 
faced border closures and violent pushbacks by Croatian police. With the EU reorienting 
security and migration to the centre of its Western Balkans agenda through an increased 
structural and infrastructural connectivity of South-East Europe with the EU, the politi-
cal leadership in Albania, Bosnia and Montenegro became unwilling to host the so-called 
disembarkation platforms (camps) on their territories, and migration is now openly used 
as a bargaining chip in the enlargement negotiations (Erebara, 2018). Simultaneously, 
the EU’s presence in the region is furthered through administrative and security appara-
tuses and the material infrastructures of border control, which include police training, 
technical equipment for border and migrant monitoring, and the possible deployment of 
Frontex at borders with the EU under the status agreements (Frontex, 2016).
The porousness of South-Eastern European borders and the region's history are inter-
twined with the emergence of the route. The historical position of South-East Europe as 
a liminal space between West and East and the corresponding presence of, and resist-
ance to, multiple political trajectories, as well as the mountainous terrain, has blurred 
the boundaries between legality and illegality. The objectives of achieving and consoli-
dating statehood have produced informal, extra-legal governance structures, economies 
and spaces that have simultaneously maintained and undermined the order in which 
they were embedded. Throughout the 1990s, criminal networks operating in the region 
ballooned, and what was originally a heroin smuggling route opened up for all sorts of 
illicit activities, including the smuggling of weapons, cigarettes, oil, food and people. 
More significant migratory transit through the route was marked in 2014 when 150,000 
Kosovans fled to Hungary, Austria and Switzerland because of chronic precariousness 
and uncertainty. This consolidated infrastructures and established logistics for the tran-
sit of Syrian, Afghan and Iraqi migrants in 2015–16. Memories of refugee and diasporic 
experiences, in addition to the emergence of new, and the mobilization of old, trans-
local activist networks, gave rise to heterogeneous solidarity structures. At the same 
time, the chronic crisis of statehood and transition has also conditioned the formation of 
material borders, immaterial borderscapes and affective economies of fear and denigra-
tion encountered by the migrants along the route. These are a result of violent territorial 
reshuffling and most recently the extreme violence that underpinned state-building in 
the 1990s in conjunction with the EU-accession-driven Europeanization of migration 
policies.
The European migration crisis spectacle visualized and designated complex and 
ephemeral trajectories of lived mobility and presence into a linear, unidirectional and 
manageable movement along the Western Balkan Route to Western Europe. It made 
illegible how migrants enact and negotiate their own subjectivity every day in the local 
contexts in which they are embedded and against a complex web of control that confines 
them and which they concurrently appropriate and overcome. This refers in particular to 
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the emergence of migrant assemblages – solidarity structures, smuggling networks, 
diasporic communities, transportation infrastructures, digital platforms, apps, and finan-
cial service infrastructures – that define processes and practices of migration and pres-
ence (Rubinov, 2014).3 Through these assemblages, migrants develop strategies to 
negotiate, appropriate and transcend spaces of control to spaces of mobility, waiting and 
action. The affective economies of hope and desire are central in negotiating and re-
appropriating the entrapment conditioned (also) by the location of South-East Europe. 
This hope for the (unattainable) European future, shared by migrants, citizens and states 
of South-East Europe, is empowering in transforming the precariousness and uncertainty 
of everyday experience into a potential otherwise/otherwhere, acting as a constitutive 
force in autonomous self-organization, while also conditioning endurance in the face of 
dangerous exposure and further precariousness and denigration (Berlant, 2011). 
Accordingly, these migrant assemblages need to be viewed outside the established dis/
order binarisms. They are produced by strategies that operate within and outside struc-
tures of subjectivity, including citizenship/non-citizenship, im/mobility, subjectification/
resistance, and in/visibility, and as such they constitute spaces of potentiality that are 
enduring as well as transcendental.
We see that the EU’s institutional order in general, and the EU/non-EU binary in 
particular, was re-appropriated, transgressed and renegotiated concurrently by migrant 
mobilities within localized contexts along the Western Balkan Route and by the 
European border control and migration management regimes’ (pre-emptive) attempts 
to capture these mobilities. If we analyse the migration crisis through the perspective 
of migratory assemblages and from the location of South-East Europe, the region 
becomes a central location where the migration crisis, as well as the EU’s crisis man-
agement, has unfolded. Accordingly, South-East Europe’s position vis-à-vis the EU 
was renegotiated in multiple disrupted temporal structures and in the uneven geogra-
phies of migrants’ mobility and presence in and through the region. Time and space 
are now constructed as going beyond the linear narrative of the migrant moving from 
her home country to a desired country of destination, as the fragmented nature of 
migratory journeys consists of periods of waiting, transit and action. Similarly, the 
idea of the region’s linear Europeanization process is challenged by the reactivation 
of former socialist and post-socialist activist networks and the memory of past hori-
zontal solidarity practices (Tazzioli and Walters, 2019). Migratory movements and 
presence in the region have in turn opened up the possibility of the production of new 
fragmented structures of migration capture and control, thereby leading to a re-bor-
dering of Europe in the region. More specifically, the frontiers of the EU’s institu-
tional order vis-à-vis the region were also renegotiated, partly, though not only, 
because of the externalization of the EU’s border and migration management through 
the structures and infrastructures of enlargement policy.
In response, the protracted narratives and practices of the European migration crisis 
have served to stabilize these emergent indeterminate structures as the ‘new normal’, by 
articulating the always potentially threatening and vulnerable migrant in conjunction 
with resilient and always potentially unstable and vulnerable South-East Europe. First, 
the European migration crisis narrative has essentialized South-East Europe as a resilient 
and adaptable non-place of transition to and frontier in and of Europe (Augé, 1995). The 
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research presented in this article contests such a normalization of the crisis, for it fails to 
recognize the region as a location of migration and its societies as migration subjects.
Migratory movements have encountered and negotiated the chronic indeterminacy of 
South-East Europe as defined by the continuities and discontinuities of European inte-
gration, post-socialism, ethno-nationalism and radical translocalism (El-Shaarawi and 
Razsa, 2018). Socio-political assemblages arising from this indeterminacy have – in an 
encounter with migrants – produced zones of control, zones of transit and zones of 
action. It is therefore impossible to reduce the societies and political institutions of 
South-East Europe to the sole position of either a vulnerable or a resilient subject.
Deconstructing the security ‘crisis’ in the Eastern 
neighbourhood
Similar to the case of South-East Europe discussed above, the following study brings 
the concurrent absence and visibility of the EU’s immediate Eastern neighbourhood 
in European crises to the fore. More specifically, it problematizes how what has previ-
ously been characterized as a chronically unstable non-EU has been reframed as a 
security challenge to the EU proper in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea by 
Russia in early 2014, the outbreak of civil war in Eastern Ukraine, and the fatal shoot-
ing down of the commercial airliner MH17. The EU’s newly developed approach to 
the region, firmly grounded in a logic of strengthening resilience through cross-bor-
der assemblages, shows the inadequacy of the EU/non-EU binary in understanding 
such crises.
While the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were preparing for their accession 
to the EU, the process being eventually completed in 2004 and 2007, the Union began to 
contemplate how to structure its future relationship with the countries that would soon 
constitute its new neighbours in the East. Against the Europeanizing soon-to-be-member 
states, who were working towards meeting the Copenhagen enlargement criteria, a space 
constructed as unstable, insecure and in a permanent state of chaos was slowly emerging 
east of the new border-to-be. Such framing was actively pursued by the soon-to-be 
Central and Eastern European member states, who rhetorically distanced themselves 
from their respective Eastern neighbours to prove their Europeanness, thereby legitimiz-
ing their own accession to the EU (Kuus, 2004; Schimmelfennig, 2001). That such rhe-
torical framing of the new Eastern neighbourhood fell on fertile ground is witnessed by 
the proposed European Neighbourhood Policy, which is meant to ‘share the benefits of 
the EU’s 2004 enlargement with neighbouring countries in strengthening stability, secu-
rity and well-being for all concerned’ (Commission of the European Communities, 2004: 
3).4 Throughout the strategy paper, the Commission (2004) discusses the neighbouring 
countries as insecure, unstable, lacking good governance, non-transparent, corrupt, eco-
nomically weak, and riddled with regional conflicts. Yet, while the region is depicted as 
a chronically unstable one, it is not a region in crisis, as witnessed by the lack of any such 
designation. Rather, these attributes constitute the mundane conditions of the partner 
countries in question, who thereby become the target of the EU’s foreign policy instru-
ments, particularly conditionality coupled with – at times – significant financial incen-
tives. It is the attempts of these Eastern European countries to navigate the European 
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Union’s conditionality that essentializes them to being permanently in a state of becom-
ing European, a concept discussed earlier in this article.
The European Union’s emphasis on conditionality, which stands at the core of both 
the broader European Neighbourhood Policy (2004) and the somewhat more focused 
Eastern Partnership (2009), which targets six specific Eastern European countries – 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – reinforced the binary 
between a ‘European’ EU proper and a ‘not-yet-European’ non-EU proper. The EU, then, 
finds itself in the midst of a ‘civilizing mission’ (Witney and Dennison, 2015: 2) in an 
area which, due to its inherent characteristics, is understood as a region with significant 
crisis potential. For their part, the six European partner countries were faced with an 
impossible task: on the one hand, positioning themselves within such a permanently 
chaotic state of being vis-à-vis the EU and, on the other hand, trying to overcome the 
permanent state of becoming European to further their prospects for closer association 
with the Union. At the same time, these countries were a target for Russia’s foreign pol-
icy instruments, which were attempting to firmly maintain the countries’ place in 
Moscow’s orbit (Averre, 2009). As a result, the Eastern European countries were forced 
to walk a tightrope between demonstrating enough reformist will towards the EU to 
continue drawing on its substantial financial aid and loans and reassuring Russia that 
their foreign policy orientation was not detrimental to its own foreign policy ambitions 
in the region (Pastore, 2014).
The EU addressed the region’s constructed geographic and governmental in-between-
ness and potential for crisis through what it knows best, namely institutional cooperation. 
Both the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership were meant to 
entangle the six Eastern European countries within a dense web of international agree-
ments, increasing their mutual interdependence, thereby embedding the six in European 
political and economic order. Yet, despite – or maybe because of – the increasingly close 
association of (at least some of) these Eastern European countries with the EU, the crisis 
potential soon escalated into what was designated a crisis proper in Ukraine.5
When, under significant pressure from Russia, the then Ukrainian President 
Yanukovych announced on 21 November 2013 that Ukraine would not sign the long-
negotiated Association Agreement with the EU at the upcoming Eastern Partnership 
summit in Vilnius a week later, few could anticipate that this would launch one of the 
most severe crises in Europe since the end of the Cold War. The very day of the announce-
ment, thousands of Ukrainian citizens took to the streets of Kyiv, Lviv and many other 
cities across the country, demanding the Ukrainian government to change course (yet 
again) and steer the country closer to Europe, as opposed to Russia. What lasted several 
months soon became known as ‘Euromaidan’, and can be read as a radical reclamation 
of Europe by the population of the non-EU proper. This is not to say that the protesters 
in the streets of Ukrainian cities appropriated European institutions, but rather the idea 
of Europe itself, as witnessed by the many banners and slogans bearing messages such as 
‘You cannot give us Europe, we are Europe’; ‘Ukraine is part of Europe’; and ‘Freedom 
is more than fear’. Representing the European order, it was not long before the EU as a 
whole and several of its member states individually became involved, attempting to 
negotiate between the protesters on the one hand and the Ukrainian government and the 
president on the other, calling for restraint on both sides, condemning the use of violence, 
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and setting the stage for peaceful and democratic parliamentary elections to be held 
within a short period of time (Pridham, 2014). Thus, the EU treated the events in Ukraine 
as a domestic political crisis that would require a domestic political solution, or, as Paet 
put it, as ‘merely another example of [S]lavic bickering that had little or nothing to do 
with [W]estern Europe’ (2015: 2). Nevertheless, while the EU at first perceived the 
Ukrainian events to be an ‘incident’ and carried on with ‘business as usual’ (Ikani, 2018: 
17), this particular crisis in Europe did become a ‘European crisis’ after all. How can we 
make sense of this? When and why did this occur? And, most importantly, what kind of 
crisis was it labelled?
Three particular events in the aftermath of the initial Euromaidan protests contributed 
to the Ukrainian ‘bickering’ turning into a fully fledged European crisis: the annexation 
of Crimea by Russia; the outbreak of civil war in the Donbass and Luhansk regions; and 
the shooting-down of commercial airliner MH17 over Ukraine. All occurring in 2014 
and all having as a common denominator some involvement of the Russian Federation, 
these events vividly brought the crisis in Ukraine to the EU proper. The annexation of 
Crimea and the outbreak of civil war not only called into question the territorial integrity 
of the EU’s neighbourhood, but also stood as testimony to the revisionist tendencies of 
Russia in (at the very least) its own backyard, sending shockwaves through many of the 
new(er) EU member states. The destruction of MH17 painfully brought to the fore the 
consequences of a regional conflict for the Union itself. The EU could no longer treat 
these events in isolation and as inherent to the instability of the Eastern neighbourhood: 
they now threatened both the security considerations of both the EU and its individual 
member states, with the EU public demanding decisive action (Johansson-Nogués, 
2018). As German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, stated bluntly after MH17 was brought 
down on 17 July 2014, carrying mostly EU citizens, ‘the Ukraine crisis is by no means 
solely a regional issue. No, this example shows us: it affects all of us’ (cited in Ikani, 
2018: 20). The fact that as a result of the Ukrainian crisis the already frail relationship 
between the EU and the Russian Federation deteriorated to previously unimaginable 
lows only aggravated the EU’s (and its citizens’) sense of a severe European security 
crisis threatening the stability of the European order (Haukkala, 2015).
With the crisis potential of the Eastern neighbourhood and its vulnerability now estab-
lished, what mechanisms did the EU devise to govern, stabilize and normalize the per-
manently unstable neighbourhood? It launched a public consultation to rethink its foreign 
policy approach, which was to be embedded in a more substantial renegotiation of its 
foreign policy identity as manifested in the new EU Global Strategy. This Strategy rec-
ognizes the ever-present potential for crises in the Eastern neighbourhood. As High 
Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, in 
her foreword to the document, expressed it: ‘Our wider region has become more unstable 
and more insecure’, with the Union itself ‘under threat’ and the ‘European security order 
. . . violated’ (European External Action Service, 2016: 3, 7).
For the EU, acknowledging that conflict and crisis is the ‘new normal’ in the Eastern 
neighbourhood (Witney and Dennison, 2015: 5) necessitated a rethinking of its foreign 
policy. Not giving up on the normative elements guiding its external action under the 
previous foreign policy conception – the 2003 European Security Strategy – entirely, the 
European Union’s engagement with the outside world was now to be guided 
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by ‘principled pragmatism’ (European External Action Service, 2016: 16). In terms of 
foreign policy objectives in the Eastern neighbourhood, the EU was to shift its focus 
from transformation to resilience (Bendiek, 2017; Korosteleva, 2018). This paradigm 
shift also made inroads into the EU’s emerging review of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy, which was the result of a public consultation process launched by the European 
Commission, which saw more than 250 responses from member states, partner govern-
ments, EU institutions, international organizations, civil society, businesses, think tanks, 
academia and other members of the public (European Commission, 2015). Can resil-
ience, then, be seen as the new rationale for governing the increasingly complex Eastern 
neighbourhood (Chandler, 2014)? Does a focus on resilience allow the European Union 
to stabilize ‘crisis as the new normal’?
The EU defines resilience as ‘the ability of states and societies to reform, thus with-
standing and recovering from internal and external crises’ (European External Action 
Service, 2016: 23). In principle, then, the EU would strengthen state capacity (where 
appropriate) and/or the respective civil societies east of its border. With a focus on resil-
ience, the EU de facto accepts the impossibility of predicting the next illegible crisis to 
emerge in Eastern Europe and rather focuses on preparing the state and/or society for the 
unknown by enhancing their adaptability (Juncos, 2017). Coupled with its newly adopted 
principled pragmatist approach to foreign policy, the overhauled European Neighbourhood 
Policy introduces several innovations: the new policy first takes into account the diverg-
ing aspirations of the individual partner countries vis-à-vis the EU; second, it is more 
interest-oriented within a reduced number of priority areas; and third, it enhances local 
ownership by closely engaging actors in civil society (European Commission, 2015).
It is thus the framing of the permanently volatile Eastern European neighbourhood as 
a security crisis in the aftermath of the events surrounding the Euromaidan protests in 
late 2013 and early 2014 that brought the neighbourhood firmly into the Union proper, 
thereby further blurring the EU/non-EU binary. Two newly conceived mechanisms con-
tribute to this blurring: the reformed Association Agreements and the creation of ad hoc 
Thematic Frameworks, both forming the cornerstone of the redesigned neighbourhood 
policy. The new generation of Association Agreements now signed between the EU and 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine respectively, are exceptional in so far as they contain 
principles, concepts and provisions of EU law ‘which are to be interpreted and applied as 
if the third [S]tate is part of the EU’, ultimately resulting in ‘integration without member-
ship’ (Van der Loo et al., 2014: 2). Thematic Frameworks, then, are the direct result of 
flexibly dealing with potential challenges as part of the EU’s focus on resilience. 
Identifying specific crisis potentialities, these frameworks are meant to go beyond the 
regularly consulted actors and are established for a limited period of time, thereby creat-
ing fluid, novel crisis management assemblages. These may bring together stakeholders 
from the EU, the partner country or countries in question, other neighbours (such as 
Turkey or Russia), other international organizations, international financial institutions, 
civil society organizations, private businesses and other social partners and serve as a 
forum for debate and for sharing and developing best practice. At the same time, these 
frameworks may even gain (temporary) access to EU institutions, technologies, and data, 
be it in the security, border management, migration, or economy domain, to name but a 
few (European Commission, 2015).
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Conclusion
This article provides a critical intervention into the ongoing discussions about the char-
acter of European crises. It problematizes these crises from the locations of South-East 
and Eastern Europe to question teleological accounts of the EU that characterize crises 
as externally produced ruptures in the EU’s institutional order. It argues that the indeter-
minacy of South-East and Eastern Europe vis-à-vis the EU illuminates and unsettles 
discourses and practices that render fissures and contingencies in the EU’s institutional 
order eventful and apprehensible as European crises, while also normalizing these crises 
in the disorderly non-EU. The European migration crisis and the European security crisis 
are addressed from the locations of South-East (migration) and Eastern (security) Europe 
to understand European crises outside of the dis/order and crisis/normality binarisms.
The article makes three propositions about how crisis management discourses and 
practices make legible and negotiate a Europe of complexity. First, the locations of 
South-East and Eastern Europe expose European crises as a privileged and conservative 
designation that normalizes multiple and split timespace structures inherent to the 
European project within the teleology of a linear and spatially bound EU institutional 
order. Illustrating this, migratory movements and the emergent grassroots solidarity 
structures in South-East Europe have transgressed the institutional, territorial and tempo-
ral boundaries between the European Union and the non-EU. We have seen Europe reas-
sembled through multiple ephemeral and non-apprehensible migratory assemblages. The 
discourses and practices of the migration crisis then stabilized these new spatial and 
temporal connectivities back to the European institutional order through formalizing, 
and then suspending, the Western Balkan Route. In the case of Eastern Europe, we 
observed how the potential for instability and insecurity to spill over into the EU proper 
has blurred the EU/non-EU binary. The linear narrative of an escalating security crisis in 
the European neighbourhood in conjunction with the logic of a resilient neighbourhood 
proved central to the EU restoring its political, economic, and security governance and 
past practices in Eastern Europe, thereby reinstalling the very same EU/non-EU binary.
Second, the article establishes that the EU’s exteriority is essentialized, captured and 
governed by EU crisis management assemblages as inherently precarious and vulnerable 
but also resilient and adaptable. Both the analysis of the EU’s border regime in South-
East Europe and the Eastern Partnership’s Thematic Frameworks indicate how the EU’s 
crisis management captures the indeterminate outside, bringing it into the EU’s institu-
tional fabric. Concurrently, complex and fluid apparatuses that exist outside the EU/
non-EU binarism are rendered normal and legitimate through the production of a self-
reflective and self-reliant resilient (South-)Eastern European subject. The transformative 
potential of the East’s indeterminacy is consequently substituted for adaptability and 
endurance.
This brings us to the third proposition about the transformative potential of endur-
ance. Our research shows that those subjected to indeterminate (chronic) crises have 
developed creative strategies to concurrently appropriate and transcend the established 
structures of crisis-governance to make sense of the European crisis on their own terms. 
This includes, for instance, dialectics between European border and migratory assem-
blages in the production of the Western Balkan Route as a space of control, action, 
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mobility, waiting and surveillance. In the case of the Eastern Partnership, this becomes 
visible when observing Ukraine’s need to position itself as a source of potential insecu-
rity to merit the EU’s continued attention (political, transformative and financial), while 
trying to overcome this aura of insecurity and instability to position itself as a ‘Western’ 
contender for closer association with the EU proper.
Notes
1. De Genova (2013) defines a border spectacle as a performance of exclusion and inclusion 
through the enforcement of a border by a constellation of actors, practices and images that 
simultaneously make ‘migrants’ visible as a category and render them illegal. Rescue spec-
tacles refer to similar performances of the concurrent visibilization and criminalization of 
human mobility through police, military and humanitarian operations at sea.
2. May and Thrift (2001) have adopted the term ‘timespace’ to conceptualize how multiple and 
heterogeneous experiences and practices of social time are spatially bounded and vice versa.
3. The digital tools outlined (platforms, phones, apps, etc.), while critical for the mobility and 
survival of migrants, are also a growing tool in border and migration monitoring and in the 
rationalization and standardization of mobility patterns through the production of data analyt-
ics for risk analysis under the EURODAC database and the eu-LISA agency (Milivojevic, 
2019).
4. Whereas the European Neighbourhood Policy as proposed by the European Commission and 
adopted by the European Council addresses the European Union’s relations with 16 partner 
countries in both its Eastern and Southern (Mediterranean) neighbourhoods, this contribution 
is concerned only with the former.
5. Whereas the war between Georgia and Russia in August 2018 was already regarded as a 
crisis in the region, it was not subsequently framed as a ‘European crisis’. Moreover, the 
EU’s reaction to this brief, five-day event was to introduce ‘more of the same’, i.e. to step 
up its focus on conditionality and on institutional cooperation. Both found anchoring in the 
Eastern Partnership, which was launched in 2009 and can be seen as a direct consequence of 
the necessity perceived by the EU of enhancing its engagement with the Eastern European 
neighbourhood (see, for instance Council of the European Union, 2009; Neuman, 2015).
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